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Purchase the case harvardbusinessonline.hbsp.harvard b en common item detail.jhtml id West Wacker Drive To Build or Not to Build Harvard Business School Case In Thomas J. Klutznick president of a Chicago based development company was considering whether he should build a Class A building on a second rate site outside the Central Loop or not.
He had a promising design but the economic conditions concurrent construction boom in other prime locations in Chicago Downtown and high interest rates suggested he Heavy Construction Contractors Email List should think long and hard before committing the company s resources to this speculative undertaking. Purchase the case harvardbusinessonline.hbsp.harvard b en common item detail.jhtml id PUBLICATIONS Mediators in Position Auctions AUTHORS Itai Ashlagi Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz PUBLICATION Games and Economic Behavior forthcoming ABSTRACT A mediator is a reliable entity which can play on behalf of agents in a given game.
A mediator however can’t enforce the use of its services and each agent is free to participate in the game directly. In this paper we introduce a study of mediators for games with incomplete information and apply it to the context of position auctions a central topic in electronic commerce. y not used in practice possess some nice theoretical properties such as the optimization of social surplus and having dominant strategies. These properties may not be satisfied by current position auctions and their variants. We therefore concentrate on the search for mediators that will allow to transform current position auctions into VCG position auctions.
He had a promising design but the economic conditions concurrent construction boom in other prime locations in Chicago Downtown and high interest rates suggested he Heavy Construction Contractors Email List should think long and hard before committing the company s resources to this speculative undertaking. Purchase the case harvardbusinessonline.hbsp.harvard b en common item detail.jhtml id PUBLICATIONS Mediators in Position Auctions AUTHORS Itai Ashlagi Dov Monderer and Moshe Tennenholtz PUBLICATION Games and Economic Behavior forthcoming ABSTRACT A mediator is a reliable entity which can play on behalf of agents in a given game.
A mediator however can’t enforce the use of its services and each agent is free to participate in the game directly. In this paper we introduce a study of mediators for games with incomplete information and apply it to the context of position auctions a central topic in electronic commerce. y not used in practice possess some nice theoretical properties such as the optimization of social surplus and having dominant strategies. These properties may not be satisfied by current position auctions and their variants. We therefore concentrate on the search for mediators that will allow to transform current position auctions into VCG position auctions.